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One of the most known analyses of the environmental problem is the discussion 
of the externalities as a market failure and the solutions that could be offered by public 
policies and law to deal with them. The classic discussion of the opposed ideas of Pigou 
and Coase has been renewed nowadays in the discussions of the option between 
command and control measures, taxation of emissions and promotion of pollution 
reduction through a carbon emissions reductions trade system, related with the climate 
changes. Generally considering, the Pigouvian model suggests taxation over polluting 
activities. Coase has criticized the approach of the economists after Pigou who accepted 
the so-called Pigouvian taxes as the solution to externalities. The possibilities of 
transacting over the social costs were the subject discussed in his “The problem of 
social cost”.  Therefore, the main aspect of the discussion in the environmental field is 
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whether the market can lead to the achievement of goals of environment protection 
instead of, or in addition to a system of taxation over polluting activities. 
As far as property rights are concerned, the Pigovian approach represents a 
restriction on them. In addition to taxation, that is itself considered as an economic 
instruments, environmental laws have created an extensive set of rules characterized as 
“command and control” that would correct the externality problem by restricting the 
right of land owners to explore its property and require them to maintain a forest area or 
requiring industry owners to meet emission and technological standards among other 
examples. 
The alternative policy tool of transactions of emission marketable allowances or 
carbon reduction certificates means an appropriation of former common natural 
resources. The state creates a kind of a property title for pure air and locates it to the 
firms, leading them to transact over it. The environmental policy approach therefore is 
based on the attribution of property rights and the creation of a market that was formerly 
inexistent.        
A similar shift, from a policy of property rights restriction to a new approach of 
the attribution of  value for environmental goods as a strategy for its preservation, can 
be observed in the monetary evaluation of preserved resources such as forests and 
sources of drinking water. The conservation of natural resources is turned into a 
precified good which entitlement is given to property owner in order to enable him to 
sell it in market basis. The value of the forest tends to increase with the enlargement of 
the market for the environmental services it is able to deliver. 
The paper proposal is to discuss this shift in the approach of environmental 
protection policies from property rights restrictions to the possibilities of transaction 
either of emission market permits or environmental services. A central aspect of the 
paper is the role of the market and the property rights to further environmental 
protection. 
 
2. Environmental problems and market failures 
 
In the capitalist economic system, markets become the central institution of 
economic organization. Prices are used by markets to communicate the needs, wants 
and limits of the society and direct the economic decisions to bring about the provision 
of such needs and wants at the lowest cost. However, market prices do not adequately 
state the value of many environmental goods and services and therefore they are not 
provided or delivered in the amount desired by the society. 
We can take biodiversity as an example. Biological diversity is related to the 
broad range of existing animals and vegetal species. Its conservation requires the 
preservation of the species’ natural habitats. However, biodiversity is at risk because of 
the conversion of forests into agricultural land, urban areas, or the introduction of 
invasive species directly or indirectly related to economic activities. The market fails to 
adequately value the biodiversity conservation since the prices of timber, urban land or 
agricultural goods are much higher, what leads to a process of deforestation. Therefore, 
no matter the importance of the biodiversity conservation and a strong preference 
society has for it nowadays, markets do not seem to be able to bring the economic 
decisions in the direction of the conservation.  
A market failure is said to occur whenever a market does not allocate scarce 
resources to generate the greatest social welfare1. As the example of the biodiversity 
shows, markets may fail to lead the decisions in the direction of environmental 
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protection. Environmental problems are usually associated with two market failures: the 
externalities and the public goods.  
Externalities are costs which burdens are posed on third parties instead of on 
those that do participate in a market transaction. It happens when “one person’s actions 
affect other people, who neither receive compensation for harm done nor pay for benefit 
gained”2.  
The externalities can be negative or positive and both can be related to 
environmental issues. Pollution is a classical example of negative externality, because 
its costs are borne by third parties that can be an individual (a neighbor of a noisy 
activity), a group (fishermen in a river polluted by an industry) or the society as a whole 
(people affected by the climate change deriving from different man-related activity). 
Environmental protection, on the other hand, produces positive externalities that also 
can affect individuals or big groups (the conservation of the remaining world rain forest 
is said to produce positive external benefits for the whole world population, even to 
future generations). 
 The public goods are a kind of positive externalities characterized by two 
specific elements: the non-exclusivity and the non-rivalry. The last means that the 
amount provided of the good for an individual does not reduce the amount available to 
others. The former means that it is impossible or very costly to exclude anyone from the 
enjoyment of the good or service. The classical example is the national defense. There is 
no way to exclude a tax debtor, for instance, from the protection a public national 
defense provided for those living in a Country, nor the amount some groups enjoy of it 
will diminish the amount available to other groups. The biodiversity conservation as 
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well as the protection against climate change are public goods. Different environmental 
protection situations can provide some other examples.  
The market is not able to produce public goods, because no one would pay for 
anything non-exclusive and non-rival. Therefore, they need to be provided by the 
government. 
 
3. The proposed solution for the market failures  
  
As referred to in the Introduction there are two influential approaches to the 
market failures problem, more precisely to the externalities.  
 The first one is influenced by Arthur Cecil Pigou, who wrote his “The 
Economics of Welfare” in the thirties. Pigou proposed that in case of negative 
externalities the government should impose a tax equivalent to the amount of its cost. 
As far as the problem of the externality is the lack of a signal of the scarcity of a natural 
resource or of the cost of pollution, the effect of such tax would be the correction of the 
price of the good and a decrease in its consumption. The opposite but similar policy 
should be addressed for positive externalities. A subsidy should be given for its 
producer in order to incentive the production of the good or service with social benefits 
can not be reaped by the producer in the price3. 
 In 1960, however, Ronald Coase criticized the so-called Pigouvian approach to 
the externalities problem. He argued basically that not so much governmental 
intervention was necessary to deal with externalities “if zero transaction costs exist”. He 
proposed the expansion of the set of markets to include non-market goods, provided the 
institutional constraints that prohibited the definition of property rights were removed. 
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“The key is to give one person property rights to the non-market good, for example, 
pollution control”4.  
 It may seem inaccurate for lawyers to talk about the creation of property rights 
for non-market goods such as pollution control, but that is the way economists describe 
that set of policies which allow a bargain over the non-market goods related to the 
externalities5. An example can illustrate the discussion. A and B are two enterprises 
located at River Red. A is a paper mill and discharges waste in the river. B is in the 
rafting and kayaking business and A´s pollution reduces its profitability. If a right to 
cleaner water (considered here as a property right) were assigned to B, A could 
compensate B for the pollution. Or such right (to define the level of pollution control) 
could be assigned to A, and then B would be willing to compensate A. The possibility 
of bargaining would lead to an optimum level of pollution, which means a balance 
between the marginal costs and marginal benefits of the pollution.  
Such example describes the so-called “Coase Theorem”: two disputing parties 
can bargain with each other and agree to an allocation of resources that is Pareto 
efficient, regardless of the party to whom unilateral property rights to the non-market 
asset are initially assigned6 Coase argues that externalities are a bilateral problem, 
meaning that society should not privilege a solution that would foreclose an efficient 
and profitable activity7. That is why he talks about “ an optimum level of pollution” and 
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7As he states: “The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has been 
made. The question is commonly thought as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be 
decided is: How should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of reciprocal 
nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. the real question that has to be decided is; should 
A be allowed to harm b or should b be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious 
harm. COASE, Ronald. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, v. 3, Oct 1960, p. 1-
44.  
 
the pollution benefits. That is an important aspect to be discussed because no 
industrialized society is able to live in a zero pollution world and no matter the policy 
instrument chosen,  legislation will always tolerate a certain level.  
There are many critics for Coase´s approach8. In the environmental field, they  
point that the bargaining would be impossible in case of diffuse effects of externalities, 
as most environmental problems cause nowadays. One of the conditions for the Coase´s 
Theorem is the absence of transaction costs and of course a negotiation involving big 
groups would not only be costly, but almost impossible. As long as future generation 
rights are at stake too, such negotiation would get even harder. 
 In spite of those critics, the ideas of Coase influenced the discussions of whether 
the market can lead to the achievement of goals of environment protection instead of or 
in addition to the so-called command and control policies and has been in the roots of 
the proposals for market instruments in Environmental Policies9. 
Command and control instruments for the protection of the Environment are 
those based on the imposition of a specific behavior for firms or individuals. The most 
common examples are the imposition by governments of emission standards for the 
different pollutants of the air and water and mandate technologies. These examples 
regard pollution control. As far as biodiversity and forest protection are concerned, 
command and control policies often oblige land owners to maintain a forest area in 
percentage of the land.  
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9 As McAallister states, “The idea of cap and trade regulation often is traced back to a 1960 article by 
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The imposition of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are not considered command 
and control, but an economic instrument, since it produces direct impacts on the costs of 
some good or service that may be prejudicial or beneficial for the Environment. Another 
kind of economic instrument used in Environmental policies is the creation of markets 
involving the right to pollutant emissions and more recently environmental services10.  
The case for  market instruments for the environment protection is often related 
to any kind of suspicion about government ability to regulate pollution control or 
environmental conservation. The most consensual reason however is related to 
efficiency. Different firms have different costs to achieve the legislation standards and 
to control pollution. Markets would allow them to transact among them in order that the 
firms which costs are low can achieve the best environmental performance and the 
others can pay them to do so.   
The present challenges of the environmental protection requires the construction 
of sound policies that can combine command and control and economic incentives. On 
the other hand, the creation of environmental markets requires a lot of governmental 
intervention building up the rules of its functioning and its success will depend on 
“moving beyond the government versus market debate” 11 . Therefore, it should be 
stressed that the enlargement of the role of the markets in the environmental protection 
does not mean exactly the reduction of importance in the State’s role.  
 
4.The creation of markets for pollution permits. 
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and resource allocation.” . LANDEN MILLS, Natasha and PORRAS, Ina T. . Silver bullet or fools’ gold? 
A global review of markets for forest environmental services and their impact on the poor, March 2002, 
available on www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/9066IIED.pdf.consulted in 03/18/2008, p. 11. 
A policy for the pollution control may include a market for pollution emission 
allowances. The basic idea beyond it is to assign a limited number of allowances  for a 
specific group (or groups) within an industry (or industries) and allow those who are 
able to cut their emissions further than their quota to sell it. Firms that are not able to 
restrain their emissions within their allowances, on the other hand, can buy it. The 
market is said to allow a more efficient result in terms of the achievement of pollution 
reduction because firms have different production and technology systems and 
therefore, their ability to cut emissions is very different as well. That would save the 
regulator from the difficult task of defining the adequate level of emissions standards to 
be applied to such different firms and industries or to define the appropriate technology 
to be installed by them. The emission standard and the technology system moreover, 
require a complicate monitoring  activity by the government, often resulting in disputes 
and negotiations between the regulator and the firms. The cap and trade system would 
allow the firms to plan their way of compliance although requiring a sophisticated 
monitoring of data and information. 
More precisely, a cap and trade system is composed of five components. First, 
the Environmental agency sets a cap on total emissions for a set of sources over a 
compliance period. Second, the cap is divided into allowances, each representing an 
authorization to emit a specific quantity of pollutant. Third, the allowances are allocated 
among the sources and can be traded among them. Fourth, the sources are required to 
measure and report their emissions throughout the compliance period. Finally, after the 
end of the compliance period, the agency compares the emissions of the sources with 
the allowances and impose penalties for those which emissions are higher12. 
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There are basically two methods for assigning the allowances. One is the 
definition of it on a basis of historical emissions (called grandfathering). The other is by 
means of an auction process where the firms would bid for the allowances. In both 
cases, if the policy goal is to reduce pollutant emissions, the assigned quotas must take 
the desired emission level into consideration. Some unsuccessful experience failures 
derived from a generous initial distribution of quotas that made cheaper to buy them 
than investing in technological change for emission reduction. 
Some cap and trade programs were established in the US since the nineties. We 
will discuss briefly two of them. The acid deposition program, created in 1995, that was 
considered successful and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market that did not 
achieve its pollution reduction aims.      
 
4.1. Acid Deposition Program. 
The Acid deposition program. was created by a 1990  amendment in the Clean Air 
Act, but was implemented only in 1995. Its policy goal  was to reduce the emissions of 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) from electric generating plants.  
The main features of the program13 was the creation of annual emission allowances 
and their distribution by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) among the plants 
based on their past emissions and the possibility of transferring of such allowances, 
provided a certification by the agency were issued.  Initially (from 1995 until 1999) it 
involved only the largest coal-fired electric generation  units and promoted a cap 
reduction from 8.7 to 7 million tons worth of SO2 allowances. After 2000, the program 
enlarged its universe including almost all fossil-fuel fired electric generating units. The 
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goal for 2010 is to establish a cap about 50% of the amount of SO2 emitted by all 
electric generating units in 1980. Since its implementation, the program has met or 
exceeded expectations in terms of compliance rates and emissions reductions. The law 
expressed limited the annual emission cap, although the allowances could be used in the 
following year.  
 As far as the legal nature of the allowances is concerned, the Law specifically 
states that “Such allowance does not constitute a property right” and describes it as a 
“limited authorization to emit sulfur dioxide”. 
Another important aspect of the program, that is considered as a special ingredient 
for its success was the role played by the EPA and the monitoring system created by the 
agency.  
 First it should be noted that no market mechanism can prescind of an inspection 
activity because the plants may emit more pollutants than their allowances. The Clean 
Air Act defines as illicit the emission of sulfur dioxide (SO2) in excess of the amount 
allowed by the quotas, but how was that rule implemented? 
 The program basically created a stringent monitoring system based on 
technology that required all sources to install a continuous emission monitoring systems 
(CEMS). This electronic device is able to measure actual emissions of SO[2] and other 
gases on a continuous basis. The data is compiled by the source computers and then 
submitted to the EPA. 
Needless to add that the creation of such a system required investments from 
EPA and the work of a well trained staff. That is an important element to discuss the 
importance of the government role not only to create but also to maintain a pollutant 
emissions market.  
 
4.2. Regional Clean Air Incentives Market - RECLAIM 
 
The RECLAIM is a regional program of the State of  California, more exactly of 
its South Coast Air Basin (Orange County, and parts of Los Angeles, San Bernardino, 
and Riverside Counties), that came into effect in 1994. The goal of the program was to 
reduce the emissions of NOx and SO2 from the largest stationary sources in the basin14.  
The sources covered by the RECLAIM Program are more heterogeneous than 
those of the Acid Rain Program, including not only power plants, but also refineries, 
asphalt and cement producers, and a wide variety of industrial sources. As the acid 
deposit control, the program adopted a cap and trade system. RECLAIM Trading 
Credits (RTC) is the unit of currency in RECLAIM. One RTC represents a license to 
emit one pound of pollutant.  
The RECLAIM Program was designed so that the annual weighed average 
reduction in RTC allowances for all facilities was about 7% and 8% for each pollutant, 
which would result in a reduction of about 47% between 1994 and 2000. However, the 
actual result was a reduction close to 20%. Moreover, that reduction was much smaller 
than the one promoted by command and control policies between 1989 and 1993 (38%). 
In addition, in 2000, there was a sudden shortage of energy in the California state that 
required the generation firms to buy more allowances and their price rose suddenly 
Many sources sold them so many allowances that there was not enough to sustain their 
own needs and the cap was exceeded.    
 The reasons appointed for such poor results are related to a weaker monitoring 
system, as compared to the acid deposition program, to a generous distribution of 
allowances in the first five years of the programs and the lack of sufficient information 
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for the firms, especially the smaller ones that did not enable them to plan their strategies 
to reduce emissions. 
Due to the heterogeneity of firms included in the program, it was not possible to 
require all of them to adopt the CEM system of information and data. As a consequence, 
the regional authority was not able to rely extensively on the electronic monitoring 
system, as the EPA does in the acid deposition program. There was the need for in loco 
verification by the agency and the occasion for many claims for revision. Moreover, 
RECLAIM did not provide for automatic sanctions for noncompliance in RECLAIM, 
unlike the Acid Rain Program. 
However, the main reason for the failure is certainly the generous distribution of 
allowances that led some firms to delay the investments in emission reductions, since 
the market provided cheap allowances.  The lack of sufficient information, especially 
for smaller firms contributed to their passive behavior, and the lack of planning 
strategies for technological changes or innovation related to the emission control. 
 That situation can make a case for the discussion of which role the government 
should have in the emission allowance markets, especially those involving a heterogenic 
group of sources. The RECLAIM experience showed the need for a support action to 
provide information and assistance to the firms in order to help them plan their 
compliance to the policies in the long run. 
 As Michael Porter15 points out, there are some characteristics for a well designed 
environmental policy: the information collection and publicity in order to allow the 
firms to be conscious of their own deficiencies in the production process and of the 
costs of their pollution emissions as well as to signal them that they will not be able to 
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have opportunistic gains resulting from the noncompliance. The RECLAIM failed to 
focus on these characteristics.      
 
 
5. The creation of markets for environmental services. 
  
 The notion of environmental services is related to the attribution of monetary 
value for some nature functions, like biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration 
and watershed protection. In the past, it was believed that the protection of forest areas 
should be done either by the government or by command and control restrictions 
imposed on private owners, the most frequent one is a rule requiring the conservation of 
a percentage of the land. The present discussions recognize the need of a deeper 
involvement of private owners of forest areas in their protection, acknowledging the 
importance of the conservation and the financial onus imposed to them if forbidden to 
develop economic activities16.   
 However, there is an initial obstacle for environmental services markets. They 
are characterized, as public goods, for being non-exclusive and non-rival. Would there 
be willingness to pay for a service that is delivered to the whole world society 
indistinctly, as the carbon sequestration? What about for the conservation of the 
biodiversity for the present and future generations? 
 The construction of an environmental services market, therefore, requires some 
changes in the demand and/or supply sides that alter its characteristics of non-
exclusivity and non-rivalry. Those changes may be a consequence of the present 
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SEIDENFELD, Mark. Microeconomic predicates to Law and Economics. Cincinnati: Anderson 
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scarcity of natural resources. We can consider as examples a decision of a water 
supplier firm to pay land owners to protect watershed or of an ecotourism hotel to pay a 
neighbor to conserve a forest area in order to keep the landscape for the enjoyment of its 
costumers. It may also be the result of institutional creation as the Kyoto Protocol 
market mechanisms that allowed the private appropriation of quotas of carbon 
sequestration17.  
 The more important markets for environmental services are biodiversity 
conservation; watershed protection; carbon sequestration and landscape beauty. Their 
level of maturity and institutionalization vary as well as the difference between the 
stakeholders and agents that act or are anyhow involved with it. 
 One import concern that can be raised about such market relates to equity. Some 
weak groups presently live in the forest areas where many of the services are generated 
and the policies for the increase of those markets need to avoid a process of exclusion of 
this people deriving, for instance of the increase in the price of the land where they live. 
Moreover, many of these groups lack formal property rights over the land making easier 
the process of exclusion. 
  As a matter of fact, the creation of markets related to forest areas should be 
linked to policies of poverty alleviation and income distribution. Some discussions 
about poverty draw attention to the basis for generating benefits and the institutional 
frameworks in which the relevant groups act. Markets can be a way to realize gains 
from the forest based assets, but that will require policies to support weak groups and 
avoid their exclusion of the activities. 
                                                 
17 The Kyoto protocol allows the emission of certificates for carbon sequestration activities related to the 
reforestation of areas and for the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases that may result from 
technological changes in different industrial activities. The last is more common and does not represent 
exactly a service performed by nature. However, its market is very close to the carbon sequestration one, 
ruled by the same norms and by the same authorities. Besides, the avoidance of climate change is 
considered also as a public good. See Handley et. Al, idem, p. 61. 
 Due to this relation of forest environmental services and poverty alleviation, the 
most important forest based commodities, traded as product of any kind of 
environmental service,  will be described. A deeper analysis of the characteristics of 
each market, however, is not within the aims of this paper. The commodities are the 
following18:  
a) Biodiversity-friendly products. Companies sell biodiversity-friendly products 
when the willingness to pay for them allow a premium price to be charged; 
b) Biodiversity credits/offsets. Where a development results in a reduction of 
biodiversity, developers can be required to offset this damage through 
biodiversity enhancement in other places. It allows the generation of finance 
for biodiversity. 
c) Bioprospecting rights. Allows an exploitation of possible products derived 
from the biodiversity and is based on a payment for the owner of the 
biodiverse land. 
d) Conservation easements. A landowner is paid to conserve an area by means 
of a contract with someone else who whishes to protect some natural 
ecosystem. The easement has a perpetual nature and in case of the sale of the 
land, the new owner will be bond by the easement. 
e) Land lease/conservation concession. It is a land lease involving the 
allocation of forest use rights in a defined area to the lessor who may explore 
some of the forest products in a sustainable way. 
f) The obtention of credits for carbon sequestration deriving from 
afforestation/reforestation activities within or not the Kyoto Protocol market 
mechanisms.   
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 The functioning of all those markets depends on a structure of intermediate 
activities such as brokers and consultants and the sophistication of those structures 
varies depending on the level of complexity of the market. The market participants may 
also be very different in all cases. Some of the activities above require a stronger 
participation of the States, some others have a deeper involvement of NGOs and others 
have private parts as the most important drivers  (carbon credit markets for instance).  
Some of these services required a minimum area and therefore, for small 
properties to be able to provide them there is a need of cooperative arrangements to 
create pools of owners.  That can be induced by legal rules or even by the work of 
multilateral agencies and NGOs. 
An interesting example of a rule enacted to create a market for small scale 
carbon offsets is the Decision 14 of the Conference of the Parties in the Kyoto Protocol 
which establishes a simplified procedure for the credits generation for small scale of 
forestation and reforestation in the developing Countries (through the Clean 
Development Mechanism)19. 
 
6. The role of property rights in the environmental policies 
 
As mentioned in the introduction above, command and control policies would 
represent a limitation on property rights. In order to justify such limitation, the doctrinal 
discussion about them laid their roots on the social function of property, which concept 
was enlarged in order to encompass an environmental dimension (the socio-
environmental function of property).  The socio-environmental function of the property 
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therefore would allow most kind of restrictions imposed by the legislation on the 
owners of land or firms on their right to explore their property rights over it. 
As discussed above, the origin of the creation of markets for the emission of 
pollutants or for the natural activities of environmental preservation is the proposal done 
by economists to assign “property-rights” to “non-market goods”. Such origin caused a 
kind of confusion between the right to transact something and the concept of property 
rights. And of course, we can not consider a right to pollution control as a property 
right.   
The concept of property is related to the rights assigned to the owner of a good:  
the right to use and enjoy as well as the right to dispose it by any legal way20. An 
important  component of such right is the exclusivity, which means the right to exclude 
anyone else from interfering to it and gives the owner the right to claim it from anyone 
who unduly takes it. 
The definition of property can refer to “the unrestricted and exclusive right to a 
thing”, or the “highest right a man can have to anything”21 and refers to the idea of 
absoluteness that also characterized the property rights since the Napoleon Code of 
1804 before the evolution of the concept encompassed the idea of social function and 
the limitations derived thereto.  
The Declaration of the Rights of the men and Citizens includes the property as 
one of the fundamental and states the need to indemnization in case of depriving22. 
Such concept was defined mainly in respect to the right over land and real estate 
in general, but the evolution of the economy allowed rights over other goods to become 
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80. 
21 Blacks law dictionary. St Paul: west publishing co., 1991, p. 845. 
22 As states its principle 17: “since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived 
thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on 
condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitable indemnified.” Available at 
www.wsu.edu, last consulted 04/14/2008. 
valuable and to require the law protection of its exclusiveness,  as for instance the 
intellectual property. The law also protects the property of movable things as opposed to 
real estate. As a general rule, the movable things belong to the one who possesses it. 
On the other hand, the evolution of the market transactions also created different 
titles that can be possessed and transacted as the variety of kinds of bonds and papers. 
These last would be close to an allowance to emit pollutant. However, the law can 
impose restrictions to their transfers or to any aspect of their use. Property rights today 
can refer to a broad range of tangible and intangible, movable or immovable things. It 
can vary also on the degree of the limitations imposed by law.  
The question to be answered therefore is whether the emission allowances or a 
carbon credit may be subject to a property right.  
As referred to above, the acid deposition control program states clearly that the 
allowances do not constitute a property right,  although the statement would not by itself 
change the nature of the right, some of the legal rules about it may be analyzed to help 
the understanding of its nature. 
One of the most important aspects of such rules is the possibility of cancellation 
by the regulator “at any time”. On the other hand most programs that create a tradable 
permit have a specific rule concerning the possibility of banking it for use or trade in a 
determined period of time, which can be considered as another limitation in the right of 
use and disposition of the thing.  The  allowance constitute an administrative permit and 
it is not possible to have a property right over it. 
The characteristics of the emission allowances and the carbon credit are close to 
an assignment of rights. However, the possibility of assignment itself, although limited 
in time and subject to other law restrictions, means recognition of a right of disposition, 
which is the most fundamental basis of a market system. Perhaps, the identification of 
the disposition right that is present in a transaction led the economies to identify all 




This paper discussed how environmental policies can create market mechanisms 
to enhance the environmental protection in an efficient direction. The building of these 
markets is based in what the economists describe as the “attribution of property rights to 
non-market goods”. The most important examples of market mechanisms in 
environmental policies are the pollutant emission markets; the carbon credit markets as 
well as some environmental services market. 
Of course the possibilities of contribution of such markets to the environmental 
preservation is not only controversial but also requires a strong role of states in its 
design and monitoring as well as a clear commitment to assure the markets will allow 
some equitable results, since the forest protection issue often involves weaker groups 
living in the forest areas, as well as small farmers.  
The paper discussed also the nature of the “property rights” created by those 
markets. The legal doctrine does describe the property as a very formal concept that 
relates to the rights of the owner over the object: utilization, enjoyment and disposition. 
Such rights over emission allowances or carbon credits are subject to severe limitations, 
but it is still possible to recognize them and to conclude that it is the existence of a 
disposition right that allows the markets to exist, although the characteristics of its 
transfer is closer to a rights assignment than to property transfer.  
Therefore the markets and the property rights have a very important role in the 
environmental policies and there is a clear trend to an increase in its utilization as 
policies instruments. However it should be remembered the challenges those markets 
impose to governments for the achievement of the environmental and social goals of the 
policies  
 
